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We the People and Other Constitutional Tales:
Teaching Constitutional Meaning through Narrative
Paula Abrams ∗
“The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries,
and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics.”

1

Imagine teaching Brown v. Board of Education 2 , the landmark constitutional law
case striking down segregated education, simply by reference to constitutional doctrine,
omitting any substantive discussion of slavery and segregation in America. In Brown, the
Court overruled the 1896 precedent Plessy v. Ferguson, 3 which held that the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection guarantee did not preclude segregation based on race. The
Court in Brown argued that the importance of education in modern society precluded
turning the “clock back” to 1896. Instead, the Court concluded it “must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life….”4
A purely doctrinal examination of Brown, however much it explored the Supreme
Court’s repudiation of “separate but equal” or its elucidation of the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, would seem strikingly incomplete. Indeed, the Court’s opinion
in Brown, short on law and long on social justice, fairly compels consideration not just of
precedent, but also of the social and political mechanisms of segregation. One can even
∗

Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon. I wish to thank Michael Blissenden,
Nigel Duncan, Anna Hemingway, Katerina Lewinbuk, Robert Mcpeake, and Laura Spitz for their review of
an earlier draft of this article. I also wish to thank the organizers of the conference, “Once Upon a Legal
Time,” Brian J. Foley, Steve Johansen, Robert Mcpeake, Erika Rackley, and Ruth Anne Robbins, for their
support of this paper.
1
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law
2
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4
Id. at 492-93.
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argue that an understanding of the profound history that shaped the case is essential to
appreciating the Court’s interpretation of equal protection norms. Most legal educators
recognize the importance of external narrative to an accurate analysis of Brown and
incorporate some history of slavery and segregation into their discussions. But what
about other landmark decisions which are studied devoid of social and historical context?
Traditional legal education through the casebook method typically omits any substantial
consideration of the external historical events that give rise to landmark cases. This
omission may ultimately serve to distort the doctrinal complexity of major cases.
All legal cases tell stories. A narrative enfolds from the initial dispute, winds
through the litigation and culminates in an appellate decision. This legal narrative is not
linear: facts generate conflict; legal process reshapes that conflict; and appellate analysis
distills both facts and process into formal principle. Thus while a case can be viewed as
one narrative, it is important to recognize that this narrative is multi-dimensional,
comprised of several distinct yet related stories. Of these various stories, the appellate
decision offers the most formalized narrative. Appellate opinions typically incorporate
only minimal facts and little information about events external to the litigation because
their primary function is to reconcile key facts with legal doctrine. Traditional legal
education, by focusing primarily on the extraction of legal doctrine from appellate
opinions, also ignores external narratives, narratives which may be essential to
understanding how significant decisions reflect and impact society.
This article examines a particular type of narrative – the story surrounding a
landmark constitutional case, including the social and political struggles giving rise to the
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case and the litigation that brings the dispute to the Supreme Court. 5 It argues that the
incorporation of this contextual narrative into constitutional analysis ensures a more
accurate understanding of constitutional meaning. This thesis is essentially an argument
in support of constitutional historicism – the conclusion that constitutional
decisionmaking is influenced by the social and political dynamics of the times. 6 The
paper demonstrates the significance of constitutional historicism by examining five
stories describing an important U.S. Supreme Court case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 7
These stories illuminate the impact of contextual narrative upon constitutional meaning.
Like most landmark constitutional cases, Pierce is a product of its time; it should not be
analyzed as if it exists in a realm inhabited only by precedent. The paper unmoors Pierce
from its conventional legal treatment in constitutional canon and legal education to reveal
the marked difference between a highly formalized legal analysis and the multi-faceted
legal, political, and social comprehension gained through contextual narrative. The
examination of Pierce will begin with the traditional legal education model and
progressively expand that model to illustrate how the understanding of constitutional
meaning changes with the addition of narrative.

5

There is a growing body of legal commentary addressing the significance of social and political context to
understanding the development of law, particularly constitutional law. For example, Reva Siegel argues
that an understanding of the social movements surrounding the development of constitutional case law can
lead to new interpretations of constitutional rights. She posits that the socio-political dynamics responsible
both for the introduction of the Equal Rights Amendment and the ERA’s failure influenced the Supreme
Court to develop equal protection doctrine prohibiting sex discrimination. See Riva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto
ERA, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1323 (2006).
6
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson argue that traditional mechanisms of legal reasoning do not always
sufficiently recognize the influence that historical, social, and political trends have on constitutional
interpretation; they argue that “legal historicism,” legal study that encompasses these trends, should be used
to more fully understand constitutional decision-making. By extension, they refer to those forms of legal
study that examine constitutional decisionmaking as the product of political, social, and historical forces as
“constitutional historicism.” Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Academics, The
Roles of Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 Geo. L.J. 173 (2001).
7
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Landmark constitutional cases generally tell stories that differ markedly from
private party litigation. These cases often extend beyond the human drama of private
disputes to touch the most significant political and social issues of their day.
Constitutional cases take on landmark status not simply because they involve
transformative legal analysis but also because they resolve pressing public controversies.
They spring from the unique historical circumstances that bring them to the Court and
illustrate the rich complexity of the interaction between constitutional law and social
movements. But appellate opinions in constitutional cases may unfold as the most
minimalist narratives of all. Many involve facial challenges to a statute or regulation
where discussion of facts and context is abbreviated because it contributes little to formal
legal examination. With these decisions, one may examine doctrine but be left with the
unsatisfactory feeling that doctrinal analysis does not fully explain the case.
Narrative, as defined in this article, is an important, and enormously overlooked,
aspect of constitutional understanding. An examination of the complex external forces
attending significant constitutional cases offers valuable insights that complement
doctrinal analysis. Narrative can elucidate circumstances that have been overlooked in the
formalized articulation of constitutional norms. It can provide not only a more nuanced
understanding of the conflict but in some instances an altered interpretation of the
constitutional resolution. Narrative can also serve a corrective function, particularly with
older cases like Pierce where actual knowledge of the socio-political history disappears.
Over time, the constitutional meaning of a case takes on a life of its own, the final
narrative dimension in a complex set of overlapping stories. The trajectory of a case, and

4
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its place in constitutional canon, may stray substantially from its original meaning. 8 The
incorporation of narrative helps protect against the doctrinal distortion that can occur
when a case is interpreted only by reference to a formalized norm.
Current constitutional theory rarely acknowledges the impact of social and
political events on constitutional interpretation. This in part stems from a perception that
the principle of judicial independence would be compromised by recognition of the
impact of socio-political context upon constitutional meaning. While courts have an
obligation to interpret the constitution from a judicial rather than a political perspective,
constitutional cases do not arise in political and social vacuums. The historical milieu in
which a case arises may very well affect the court’s understanding of constitutional
principles. From a jurisprudential perspective, historical context is a critical aspect of
constitutional analysis because it illuminates how events impel the court into new insights
about basic constitutional guarantees.
There certainly are notable exceptions where both the Court and legal analysts
acknowledge the significance of socio-political context to constitutional interpretation.
The most obvious example of this recognition is the use of the Framers’ intent as a
legitimate tool of constitutional interpretation. More recently, the Court has examined
historical practices for the purpose of determining whether certain interests are protected
as liberties under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the
Court’s test for protecting these liberty interests – whether the right in question is so
8

The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that interpretation of texts is not fixed, in fact it is
an “infinite process” that is “never finished.” To Gadamer, it is incomplete to understand a text only
historically because the historical context is inevitably in tension with present experience and perspective.
Thus meaning changes not only through understanding historical context but also by recognizing that time
produces new meaning. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Elevation of the Historicality of Understanding to
the Status of Hermeneutical Principle, in The Critical Tradition (David H. Richter, 3rd Ed., New York
Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 2006).
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deeply ingrained in the traditions of the country as to be deemed fundamental – is a
testament to the importance of historical narrative. In legal education too, there are some
cases where mere doctrinal extraction from an appellate opinion is considered
insufficient. Marbury v. Madison, the foundational precedent establishing the authority
for the federal judiciary to review the constitutionality of legislative and certain executive
acts, is considered by many the most important decision in American constitutional law
and it is often the first case taught in a constitutional law course. 9 A student’s
comprehension of the Court’s analysis of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789
is greatly enhanced when the case is discussed in the context of the political battle raging
between the Federalists and the Jeffersonians for control of the government and the
judiciary. Brown v. Board of Education, described earlier, is a paradigmatic example of a
foundational constitutional case which can be fully understood only if social context is
included with doctrinal analysis. One can argue that the brief Brown opinion, striking for
its minimalist legal analysis, and based substantially on sociological data demonstrating
the harm caused to children by segregated schooling, is the most significant example of a
landmark opinion that does make social context part of constitutional interpretation. The
Court overruled Plessy primarily because it concluded that an evolved understanding of
the impact of segregation transformed the constitutional meaning of equal protection of
the law. But the opinion offers little insight into the sweeping historical struggle that
culminated in the Court’s conclusion that separate is inherently unequal. Without the
inclusion of contextual narrative, comprehension of the Court’s dramatic doctrinal shift
diminishes.

9

5 U.S. 137 (Cranch) 1803.
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Pierce v. Society of Sisters is another example of a case that cannot be fully
understood by reading the few paragraphs written by the Court to resolve the dispute. In
fact, the emphatic language used by the Court in its very brief opinion leaves one with the
conviction that there is far more to the case than can be discerned from doctrinal analysis.
If we examine the decision, and its conventional treatment in most casebooks, we can see
how the addition of contextual narrative actually alters the meaning of the case.
Pierce arose out of an initiative passed in Oregon in 1922 which would have
required all children to attend public school. In 1925, the Supreme Court found the
Oregon law unconstitutional. The Court held that the law violated the constitutionally
protected right of parents to control the upbringing and education of their children. The
U.S. Constitution says nothing, of course, about parental rights. The Court held that
parental rights are protected as “liberty” interests under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This reduction of Pierce to its constitutional holding becomes
the starting point for evaluating the impact of narrative on constitutional meaning. The
formalist doctrinal description of Pierce constitutes the first story of the case. Five
stories are presented. Each story is factually accurate. Each story is incomplete. With the
addition of levels of contextual narrative, other stories evolve, culminating in an
understanding of Pierce that is not only more comprehensive but is doctrinally distinct
from the formulation in the first story.
Story #1. Doctrinal Minimalism. Constitutional doctrine can be taught simply
as a collection of legal norms. This “black letter law” approach emphasizes law as rules
and tends to minimize analysis of the development of law. Even in classes where

7
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doctrinal development is stressed, some cases will be taught in the minimalist mode
because time constraints limit the number of cases that can be considered in depth.
The doctrinal minimalist approach to Pierce focuses exclusively on the Court’s
holding that parental rights are protected as liberty interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The pivotal language quoted from the opinion to support the minimalist
approach is the Court’s pronouncement that “…we think it entirely plain that the act of
1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.” 10 The key doctrinal point for
the minimalist is the Court’s recognition of parental rights as constitutionally protected
interests. Parental rights take their place on a short list of unenumerated rights identified
and protected by the Court. No attention is given to the historical context for the Oregon
law. Little, if any, attention is given to the purported justifications for the law. Certainly,
the identification of unenumerated rights protected by the Court is important. But the
minimalist approach, by unhinging the holding from the social and political context of
Pierce, fails to illuminate a broader constitutional principle fundamental to the case.
Story #2. Legal History Minimalism. Most constitutional law casebooks
organize cases by subject matter. Within that subject matter, some legal history may be
included. For example, many constitutional law casebooks trace the Court’s early
struggles with Commerce Clause doctrine before presenting the modern cases. Similarly,
most casebooks devote some coverage to the development of political speech doctrine
under the First Amendment. This doctrinal history provides important insights into how
constitutional interpretation may evolve over time. It offers students an analytical depth
beyond the mere extraction of rules, allowing them to better understand the interpretive
10

268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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challenges faced by the Court. But with many landmark cases, a thorough understanding
of doctrine, and doctrinal evolution, requires consideration of the broader social context
in which doctrinal changes occur. For example, students may learn, as a matter of
doctrinal development, that prior to the 1930’s, the Court held that the federal Commerce
Clause power generally did not extend to the regulation of “local” activities within a state
but that by the mid-1930’s the Court reversed itself, upholding federal legislation
regulating local activities formerly found immune from federal control. 11 Students gain
little from studying this dramatic doctrinal flip, other than collecting opposed rules,
unless they also learn about the forces brought to bear on the Court from the
industrialization of the country, the Great Depression, and the political branches of
government. The selective incorporation of socio-political context into the teaching of
landmark constitutional cases suggests there is some recognition of the relevance of this
information. Yet there has been little overt acknowledgment by constitutional law
analysts or educators of the significance of social context to understanding constitutional
meaning.
Any attempt to place Pierce in even a minimalist legal history context reveals a
doctrinal complexity to the case not disclosed by the black letter law approach of Story
#1. Although Pierce is best known for its constitutional recognition of parental rights,
the case was decided during the Lochner era, roughly designated as the first three decades
of the twentieth century, when the Court aggressively protected economic interests under
the same liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment relied upon in Pierce. Story #2

11

See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), (upholding legislation prohibiting the interstate shipment of
goods produced by employees paid below a prescribed minimum wage); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), (upholding Congress’s ability to regulate the production of wheat grown primarily for home
consumption and not shipped across interstate boundaries).
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unfolds by examining Pierce in its legal history context. The Lochner era has been
virtually demonized by subsequent precedent and legal analysts as a time when the Court
strayed from principled constitutional analysis and blatantly substituted personal value
judgments for objective interpretation. 12 During this time, a deeply conservative Court
reacted with hostility to a dramatically new social order by upholding challenges to an
unprecedented wave of progressive economic and labor legislation promulgated by the
state and federal governments. The Court generously employed “liberty of contract” to
protect the free market order from regulation.
Pierce is one of only two constitutional cases during this era decided on the basis
of “personal” rather than economic liberty. Notably, the challenges raised in the case
offered the Court the opportunity to rest its decision on economic liberty. But the Court
chose to recognize parental rights instead. Thus from a legal history perspective, it is
important to consider the decision in light of its place in the Lochner era. Pierce
becomes part of a larger doctrinal picture, that of a Court highly unreceptive to intrusive
governmental regulation of any sort. In this doctrinal landscape, the Court’s protection of
parental rights per se becomes less significant than its pervasive anti-statist philosophy.
Thus even a cursory incorporation of historical context suggests Pierce addresses both a
broader and more subtle constitutional principle than revealed by Story #1.
Story #3. Doctrinal Maximalism. Any in-depth treatment of Pierce is likely to
focus on its place in the canon of cases protecting privacy and other unenumerated
personal liberty interests. The Court’s foray into unenumerated rights remains one of the

12

But see David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental
Rights Constitutionalism, 92 Geo. L.J. 1, 2003. Bernstein argues that Lochner-era Justices were not
motivated by personal value judgments against economic regulations, but by the belief that freedom of
contract was a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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most controversial areas of constitutional law and most casebooks devote substantial
coverage to the question of whether the Court’s protection of these rights is legitimate
constitutional interpretation.
The importance of Pierce as precedent emerges when the case is examined in the
broader doctrinal landscape of unenumerated rights. Pierce is the first case to rely fully
on constitutional grounds to insulate intimate family and personal choices from
legislative intrusion. As such, it is considered one of the foundational cases supporting
the right of privacy. In addition, Pierce’s recognition of parental rights exemplify the
type of personal and family based fundamental interests currently given judicial
recognition as liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The problem with the wholly doctrinal approach, even the deeper look of Story
#3, is that it overly formalizes the case by seeking to make Pierce fit into one doctrinal
niche. Pigeonholing Pierce as simply a case about parental rights ignores the less
obvious analytical concerns of the Court. Consider, for example, the most famous
passage in the opinion:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public school
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 13
The significance of the Court’s language in this passage is unlikely to be
appreciated without the addition of historical context. The Court’s opinion powerfully
rejects the state’s authority to “standardize” its children, and insists that “the child is not
13

268 U.S. at 535.

11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1095046

the mere creature of the state.” This language, in the key passage in the opinion, strongly
suggests that the Pierce opinion speaks to more complex concerns than the parental rights
principle to which it is too often confined. And indeed, to fully comprehend Pierce one
must understand why the Court described mandatory public education as an effort by the
state to “standardize” children. But the Court makes no effort to elaborate on why it
chose this tantalizing language and the reader cannot discern its import simply from the
text. The purely doctrinal approach to Pierce of Story #3 thus poses the risk of distorting
constitutional meaning.
Story #4. Litigation History. The litigation story of a landmark case, including
the briefs and court hearings, offers insight into the doctrinal arguments that will shape
the Court’s transformative decision. A different tale of Pierce emerges from a case study
of the litigation. The Oregon law challenged in the case, requiring all children to attend
public school, is frequently described as “anti-Catholic” legislation. The law, while
impacting all private schools, both secular and religious, would have disproportionately
burdened the Catholic school system, which was the largest private school network in
Oregon (and throughout the country). The primary plaintiff in the case, the Society of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, operated the majority of the Catholic
schools in Oregon. The National Catholic Welfare Conference agreed to fund the
Supreme Court litigation because it deemed the case so significant.
The Oregon law clearly posed a threat to religious education but the plaintiffs
chose not to build their case around a religious liberty claim. The Supreme Court had not
yet applied the First Amendment protections of religious liberty to state, as compared to
federal, legislation. So although the plaintiffs invited the Court to apply the First
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Amendment to the states and entertain a religious liberty claim, they focused their case
on parental rights. The plaintiffs believed that the conservative, antistatist Court would
respond favorably to an argument that parental prerogative should prevail against efforts
by the state to monopolize education. Religious intolerance remained a pervasive subtext
of the litigation however. The Court was well aware of the anti-Catholic history of the
law because charges of religious bigotry surfaced repeatedly in the briefs and oral
arguments.
The most pervasive litigation theme is revealed obliquely through the key passage
in the opinion criticizing the state for efforts to “standardize” its children through
mandatory public education. The doctrinal approach of Story #3 failed to explain the
significance of this language but an examination of the litigation history in Story #4
begins to expose fully Pierce’s doctrinal complexities. During the 1920’s, the Court, and
the country, were alarmed by the spread of communism and concerned that radicalism
threatened the stability of the country. The parties in Pierce asked the Court to evaluate
compulsory public schooling in light of the national security of the country. Both sides
argued that the fate of American democracy could hang on the Court’s decision. Oregon
claimed mandatory public schooling was necessary to facilitate the assimilation of
immigrants. More specifically, Oregon argued that unassimilated immigrants posed a
national security risk. Immigrants were heavily represented in Bolshevik, socialist, and
communist groups and the state argued in its brief that if the Court found the Oregon law
unconstitutional, “…it is not only a possibility but almost a certainty that within a few
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years the great centers of population in our country will be dotted with elementary
schools which instead of being red on the outside will be red on the inside.” 14
The plaintiffs, no less than the state, pushed the Court to evaluate compulsory
public education in light of the communist menace confronting democracy in the early
1920’s. They insisted that compulsory public education was an attribute, not of
democracy, but of tyranny, where the state, not parents, controlled the upbringing and
training of its children. The plaintiffs argued that “[i]t need, therefore, not excite our
wonder that today no country holds parenthood in so slight esteem as did Plato or the
Spartans – except Soviet Russia.” They argued to the Court that in Soviet Russia
“children do belong to the state” and that “[i]n final analysis, it is submitted, the
enactment in suit is in consonance only with the communistic and Bolshevistic ideals
now obtaining in Russia, and not with those of free government and American
conceptions of liberty.” 15
Thus the language in the Court’s opinion takes on new meaning when filtered
through the lens of the parties’ preoccupation with communism. It was widely perceived
that communism threatened liberty by “standardizing” education and the individual. The
Court, by employing similar language of standardization, along with the pointed remark
that the child is “not the mere creature of the state,” intended to demarcate a fundamental
constitutional line, a point at which the exercise of state power is no longer consistent
with American democratic principles. In rejecting compulsory public education, the
Court selected language that implicated a far more comprehensive constitutional principle
14

Brief of Appellant, The Governor of the State of Oregon, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925). Reprinted in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, COMPLETE RECORD 102-03 (The Belvedere Press,
Inc. 1925).
15
Brief on Behalf of Appellee, The Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, OREGON
SCHOOL CASES, supra note 14, at 275.
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than the protection of parental rights. The strongly antistatist message of Pierce
becomes apparent only through the addition of historical context.
Story #5 Pierce Redux. So what is the real story of Pierce? Stories 1-4 offer
varying doctrinal insights and legal history perspectives. While each of these stories is
accurate, each alone fails to capture the essence of the case. In fact, Stories 1-4 provide
only a glimpse into the fascinating legal and political landscape that is at the core of
Pierce. Story #4, by exploring the litigation in greater depth, comes closest to capturing
the true heart of the case. But Story #4, because it is limited to the litigation chronicle,
incorporates very little of the external influences shaping the conflict that brought Pierce
to the Court. Story #5 extends beyond doctrine and litigation to focus on the social
movements impacting the Pierce case. Story #5 demonstrates that widening the lens
through which we view major cases may be essential, not only to an enriched
understanding, but also to a more precise articulation of doctrine.
The origins of the compulsory public education law can be traced to the nativist
groups that flourished in the post-war years. These groups, along with patriotic societies,
convinced many Americans that whatever was foreign was anti-American. Immigrants
and non-Protestants were linked with subversive politics. The large influx of immigrants
to the United States during this period aggravated fear of a foreign-imported leftist
revolution and incited hostility to immigrants. Nativists demanded the government take
action to assure that immigrants assimilated quickly into American society. Private
schools, particularly those established by Catholic and German Lutheran immigrants,
came under suspicion by those who feared these schools failed to instill proper American
values. Nativist groups, including the Ku Klux Klan, supported a nationwide campaign

15
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for compulsory public schooling to control the assimilation of immigrants. The Oregon
case was widely viewed as a test case to determine the fate of similar legislation proposed
in other states.
The Oregon initiative was pushed by the Ku Klux Klan, which became a powerful
political force in the state during the early 1920’s. The Klan’s anti-Catholic sentiments
were well known in Oregon but the Klan also successfully solicited moderates who were
attracted to the group’s 100% Americanism platform. Thus the compulsory public
education law cannot be dismissed as the simple product of religious bigotry.
The Oregon battle over compulsory public education brought into conflict two
deeply held American traditions. Oregonians, politically populist and progressive,
embraced public education as anti-elitist and many believed that mandatory public
schooling would provide the class-leveling essential to successful democracy. Opponents
of the measure sought to convince voters that the measure jeopardized fundamental
American liberties such as parental rights and religious freedom. Opponents also played
the radicalism card, insisting that compulsory public education only existed in communist
or autocratic regimes. In the end, these arguments failed to convince voters anxious to
“Americanize” immigrants and fearful that private religious schools failed to inculcate
patriotism. Oregon Progressives joined hands with the Klan to pass the first compulsory
public education law in the country.
These themes of intolerance, assimilation, and national security provide the social
and political context for the Court’s consideration of the Oregon law. The Taft Court had
already shown its willingness to protect unenumerated economic liberties against the
perceived intrusions of an overbearing state. The plaintiffs offered a conservative Court a
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persuasive argument on behalf of parental rights, rights that carried a substantial common
law pedigree. The Court’s constitutional recognition of parental rights, the conventional
doctrinal lynchpin of Pierce, while important, is only a part of the constitutional meaning
of the case. Indeed, parental rights serve primarily as a vehicle for the Court’s deeply
anti-statist constitutional perspective. The Court’s conclusion that state monopoly of
education is inconsistent with basic democratic principles imparts a far more
comprehensive message about individual liberty and state power than can generally be
gleaned from the doctrinal reduction of Pierce to a case about parental rights. This
analytical dimension truly emerges only upon an examination of the social and political
dynamics giving rise to Pierce. The inclusion of this narrative subtly, but definitively,
affects the ultimate constitutional meaning of the case.
The richness, and significance, of the Pierce stories attest to the role of contextual
narrative in deciphering constitutional meaning. These diverse narratives illuminate the
limitations of the traditional legal teaching mode, including the doctrinal distortion than
can occur from an overemphasis on distilling precedent. The Pierce case, in particular,
offers a powerful example of the impact of contextual narrative because the Court’s brief
opinion discloses little of the complex constitutional, social, and political values at stake.
Not all constitutional opinions present such enigmas however. Many decisions,
particularly more modern ones, develop the factual context in substantially greater detail
than in Pierce. But even in opinions where the facts are thoroughly developed, little, if
any, attention is devoted to the socio-political dynamics driving the case. As the Pierce
narrative demonstrates, this context may be critical to doctrinal accuracy. Recognition of
the value of historical context to constitutional analysis is likely to occur however only if
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there is a willingness to look outside the traditional constitutional law paradigm and
acknowledge that a major constitutional opinion is a historical moment comprised of
more than doctrinal transformation. Constitutional change occurs because of
circumstances that push the Court to consider constitutional principles in a new light.
Historical context analysis, by revealing these circumstances, elucidates constitutional
meaning; law and history should not be viewed as separate and mutually exclusive
spheres.
Teaching to the Tale. The addition of contextual narrative to constitutional
analysis can benefit educators with diverse pedagogical goals. A historically informed
inquiry most obviously furthers constitutional analysis grounded in historicism. For the
historicist, contextual narrative is essential to understanding how constitutional
decisionmaking is impacted by socio-political influences. But contextual narrative also
serves those educators who emphasize normative analysis and use appellate opinions
primarily to critique the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. As the Pierce
narrative demonstrates, historical context advances normative analysis by providing more
nuanced insights into constitutional meaning.
The traditional pedagogy embodied in the casebook method incorporates few, if
any, of the contextual narratives surrounding major decisions. The constitutional law
educator thus faces a somewhat daunting task in researching and compiling contextual
narratives. Given the dearth of teaching materials, it may be unrealistic even for a
motivated educator to dramatically transform the educational experience through
narratives. But it is possible to begin to teach students their significance.
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There are several ways narratives can reasonably be included without re-crafting
an entire course. One is to have the students read a lengthy study of one major case,
typically at the beginning of the semester. Supplemental materials developing the
historical context of landmark cases are increasingly available in the form of articles,
book chapters, and books. This approach gives students an in-depth look at one case and
brings alive the importance of historical context to constitutional meaning. This lesson
can be revisited as students work through other cases. Analysis of most major cases
should incorporate some historical context introduced through supplemental materials or
through lecture. For those who prefer not to assign a long text to start the course, the
same result can be achieved with short supplemental materials and lecture accompanying
case discussion. Another approach is to assign one or two students to each landmark case
and have them undertake very limited research on the case so they can contribute relevant
historical context to the discussion. Students enjoy this method as long as they
understand they are not being assigned a major research project. In seminars, students
can be assigned more extensive research and be asked to develop a historical narrative for
a major case.
Regardless of whether students or professor will provide the narrative context, it
is effective to start the analysis of the case by asking the students to explain the decision
in the narrowest context possible. For example, in regards to the Pierce case, students
should start with a doctrinal minimalist analysis that explains the Oregon law, the
litigants, the issue presented and the holding. Once the basics are clear, introduce the
narrative context through lecture or student presentations. Ask the students to analyze
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how the addition of socio-political context and litigation strategy enhances or changes
their understanding of the case.
Whatever method and extent used to incorporate historical narrative, the
important lesson for students is that socio-political context does have a role in
deciphering constitutional meaning. This lesson alone challenges the traditional
constitutional law paradigm. But a historically informed analysis also has pedagogical
significance beyond enriching the interpretation of any one particular case. It gives
students a valuable perspective for understanding that constitutional norms are not
necessarily fixed, but may, chameleon-like, reflect the unique political and social
environment that produces a landmark constitutional case.
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